We augment a standard macroeconomic model to analyze the e¤ects and limitations of balance sheet policies. We show that the central bank can stimulate real activity by changing the size or the composition of its balance sheet, when interest rate policy is ine¤ective. Speci…cally, the central bank can stabilize the economy by increasing money supply against eligible assets even when the policy rate is at the zero lower bound. By changing the composition of its balance sheet, it can a¤ect interest rates and, for example, neutralize increases in …rms' borrowing costs, which is not possible under a single instrument regime. We further analyze the limitations of balance sheet policies and show that they are particularly useful under liquidity demand shocks.
Introduction
Central banks in industrialized countries have responded to the recent …nancial crisis with unconventional monetary policies. The Bank of England (BoE) and the US Federal Reserve (Fed), for example, have set the policy rate at its zero lower bound (ZLB) and introduced various lending facilities as well as direct asset purchases. 3 These policies, which have been summarized by the term "balance sheet policy" (see Borio and Disyatat, 2009) , were aimed at reducing spreads attributable to illiquidity (see Kocherlakota, 2011) , stabilizing stressed credit markets (see Yellen, 2009) , and stimulating spending and real activity (see Bean, 2009 ). However, they have been implemented with only little theoretical or empirical guidance available. In particular, conventional macroeconomic models are unable to explain how liquidity providing operations can be e¤ective at the ZLB, where money demand is typically not well de…ned.
In this paper, we augment a standard macroeconomic model to be applicable for the analysis of balance sheet policies in addition to pure interest rate policy, on which the New Keynesian paradigm has focussed. Given that we aim at providing a basic framework that facilitates a generic analysis of the e¤ects and the limitations of balance sheet policies, we specify the model in a su¢ ciently simple way to derive analytical results. We thereby focus on monetary policy implementation and money supply by the central bank, while we disregard the possibility of central banks to mitigate disruptions of private …nancial intermediation. 4 We show that changing the size and the composition of the central bank balance sheet can be non-neutral, as long as money is positively valued and assets eligible for central bank liquidity providing operations are scarce; the latter property being re ‡ected by the existence of a liquidity premium. We show that balance sheet policies are particularly useful when the implementation of a stabilizing policy via policy rate adjustments reaches its limits. This is demonstrated for exogenously driven shifts in …rms' borrowing costs that cannot be neutralized by policy rate adjustments alone and for the case where the policy rate hits the ZLB. We further examine the scope of balance sheet policies and quantify their maximum e¤ects. The analysis, in particular, rationalizes the types of liquidity providing facilities that were introduced by the BoE or the Fed in 2008-2009. 1 The term quantitative easing refers to an increase in the supply of reserves via purchases of securities, such as government bonds (see Bernanke et al., 2004 ). Conducting such a policy when the policy rate is at the ZLB should be ine¤ective according to conventional macroeconomic models since money demand is not well de…ned or assumed to equal a satiation level at the ZLB (see Krugman, 1998 , Walsh, 2010 . Speci…cally, quantitative easing in terms of treasury securities should be irrelevant as long as they do not change expectations about the future conduct of monetary and …scal policy (see Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003, or Curdia and .
Moreover, a policy that exclusively changes the composition of the central bank's balance sheet, which will be labelled collateral policy in this paper, 5 is obviously neutral in single interest rate models, where assets are perfect substitutes. Hence, standard macroeconomic models are hardly able to account for broad empirical evidence, which suggests that the above mentioned lending facilities of the BoE and the Fed have been e¤ective, in particular, by easing money supply and by reducing liquidity premia (see e.g. Joyce, 2010, and Fleming, 2012 , for an overview).
We apply a macroeconomic model that mainly di¤ers from a canonical New Keynesian model by accounting for the scarcity of assets eligible in open market operations. We assume that government bonds as well as corporate debt can serve as collateral for central bank operations, whereas other assets (like debt issued by households) are not eligible. The central bank sets the policy rate, i.e. the price of money in terms of eligible assets, and decides on the size and the composition of its balance sheet. Private agents rely on money for goods market purchases, while money is supplied only in exchange for eligible assets, which leads to a spread between the interest rate on non-eligible and eligible assets, i.e. a liquidity premium. Thus, interest rates on non-eligible assets can be positive, even if the policy rate is at the ZLB, which is consistent with the empirical observation that interest rates on non-money market securities typically do not hit the ZLB. This implies positive opportunity costs of money holdings, such that money demand is well de…ned and expansionary balance sheet policies can be non-neutral.
Firms are assumed to demand loans for working capital and to issue debt subject to default risk. An increase in default risk, which is induced by shocks to the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity (like in Christiano et al., 2013) , raises …rms' costs of borrowing and thereby exerts a downward pressure on production. We further consider demand shocks, e.g. shocks to the rate of time preference and liquidity demand shocks, which both can induce an endogenously adjusted policy rate to hit the ZLB. In this framework, we examine quantitative easing (i.e. an increase in the amount of eligible assets), which raises money supply like a conventional money injection, and collateral policy (i.e. accepting loans as collateral while keeping the size of the balance sheet constant), which can lower the …rms'cost of borrowing by reducing the (il-)liquidity premium on loans. We show that both types of balance sheet policies a¤ect the equilibrium allocation and prices when eligible assets are scarce (or, phrased in technical terms, when the collateral constraint in open market operations is binding), which is re ‡ected by a liquidity premium on these assets. 6 If, however, an expansionary monetary policy is conducted in an excessive way, balance sheet policies can become ine¤ective when the valuation of liquidity falls to zero, indicating that collateral is abundant.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. Quantitative easing and collateral policy are in general not equivalent to policy rate adjustments and can enhance the ability of the central bank to stabilize in ‡ation and output compared to a pure interest rate policy. We show that a collateral policy, i.e. exchanging corporate debt against government bonds held by the central bank, directly a¤ects …rms' borrowing costs and therefore the marginal costs of production. In contrast to a pure interest rate policy, a collateral policy can thus neutralize an increase in borrowing costs of …rms induced by adverse (default risk) shocks. 7 Quantitative easing can enable a central bank to implement a stabilizing policy even when the policy rate is at the ZLB and the central bank cannot commit to future policies. To explore the limits of balance sheet policies, which are reached when a stimulating policy drives down the liquidity premium to zero, we present numerical results for an augmented version of the model with capital accumulation. We …nd that the maximum e¤ect of an isolated quantitative easing policy on output is equivalent to the output e¤ect of a 7 basis point reduction in the policy rate. We further consider a shock to the liquidity demand for investment, which has been suggested by Del Negro et al. (2013) as major factor in the crisis of 2008. This shock drives downs the policy rate to the ZLB and leads to a pronounced output contraction as well as a to strong increase in the liquidity premium. We …nd that even a maximum quantitative easing policy cannot neutralize this shock, though, it can mitigate the output contraction by 50%. 6 A liquidity premium exists when eligible assets can be exchanged against money at a price (i.e. the policy rate) that is lower than the consumption Euler equation rate, which measures private agents'marginal valuation of money. Based on US data, Canzoneri et al. (2007) provide evidence in favor of a positive average spread between a standard consumption Euler equation rate and the policy rate, which they identify with the Federal Funds rate. 7 In a companion paper, Schabert (2012) applies a closely related model and shows that the additional monetary policy instruments can help to overcome the well-known monetary policy trade-o¤ between stabilizing prices and closing output-gaps.
Thus, balance sheet policies are particularly powerful when the economy is hit by liquidity demand shocks, which increase liquidity premia, as in the recent …nancial crisis.
The paper is related to a large literature on monetary policy options at the ZLB, which typically advocates providing monetary stimulus by shaping expectations on future policies is (see e.g. Krugman, 1998 , Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003 , and Adam and Billi, 2007 . Motivated by central bank responses to the recent …nancial crisis, a literature on non-standard policies under …nancial market imperfections has recently developed (see Gertler and Karadi, 2011 , Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2011 , or Curdia and Woodford, 2011 , where …nancial intermediation by the central bank is shown to be bene…cial under severe …nancial market disruptions. Applying a an overlapping generations model where investment in assets are subject to margin requirements, Ashcraft et al. (2011) show that the required return on an eligible asset falls when the central bank reduces the haircut applied to this asset. Chen et al. (2012) examine output and in ‡ation e¤ects of large scale asset purchases in an estimated model with segmented asset markets. Del Negro et al. (2013) consider a negative shock to the resaleability of assets to match the U.S. economy in late 2008, and …nd that the Fed's policy interventions prevented a second Great Depression.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3, we describe the conditions under which balance sheet policies are e¤ective, and demonstrate that monetary policy instruments are in general not equivalent. In Section 4, we show how balance sheet policies can be applied in response to default risk shocks and in the case where the ZLB on the policy rate is binding. In Section 5, we examine the limits to balance sheet policies. Section 6 concludes.
The model
In this Section, we present a sticky price model where money demand is induced by households facing a cash-in-advance constraint and …rms requiring working capital. To account for common central bank practice, we assume that money is supplied by the central bank only in exchange for eligible assets, which is modelled by a collateral constraint for open market operations. 8 The central bank sets the policy rate and decides on the size (quantitative easing) and the composition (collateral policy) of its balance sheet. In particular, it controls the fractions of assets that are eligible in open market operations (which can alternatively be interpreted as haircuts on assets under discount window lending). Households'investment decisions take these policies into account, which gives rise to interest rate spreads resulting from liquidity premia. Quantitative easing and collateral policy can lower these liquidity premia and can stimulate aggregate demand. To present the problems of households and …rms in a transparent way, we introduce indices for individual households and …rms.
For analytical convenience, we consider three types of …rms. 9 Perfectly competitive intermediate goods producing …rms face idiosyncratic productivity shocks, require working capital, and issue intraperiod loans that are subject to default risk. Monopolistically competitive retailers buy intermediate goods and sell a di¤erentiated good at prices set in a staggered way. Competitive bundlers buy the di¤erentiated goods from the retailers and assemble the …nal good. 1. The labor market opens, where a perfectly competitive intermediate goods producing …rm j hires workers n j;t . We assume that it has to pay workers their wages in cash before goods are sold. Since the …rm does not hold any …nancial wealth, it has to borrow cash, while it does not commit to repay. Firm j thus faces the constraint
Timing of events
where w t denotes the real wage rate, P t denotes the …nal goods price and L j;t =R L j;t the amount received by the borrowing …rm. Lenders sign standard debt contracts with ex-ante identical …rms at the same price 1=R L t , taking into account that a fraction t of all loans can be used as collateral for repurchase agreements (repos) and that a fraction e t of …rms default.
2. Open market operations are conducted, where the central bank sells or purchases assets outright or supplies money via repos against collateral at the rate R m t . In contrast to debt issued by households, corporate loans and government bonds can be eligible. In period t, household i receives new money (injections) from the central bank I i;t in exchange for eligible assets, where loans are only held under repos. 10 Speci…cally, the central bank supplies money against fractions of randomly selected bonds B t and loan contracts t , such that money supply is rationed according to the following collateral constraint:
After receiving money I i;t from the central bank, household i delivers the amount L i;t =R L t to …rms according to the debt contract. Its holdings of money, bonds, and loans then are 
Household i 0 s stock of money then equals f M i;t = M H i;t 1 +I i;t (L i;t =R L t )+P t w i;t n i;t P t c i;t 0, while its stock of bonds amounts to e B i;t = B i;t 1 B c i;t
0.
4. Before the asset market opens, household i receives government transfers P t i;t and dividends of …rms and retailers, which sum up to P t v i;t . Repos are settled, i.e. household i buys back loans L R i;t = R m t M L i;t and bonds B R i;t = R m t M R i;t from the central bank. In the asset market, households receive payo¤s from maturing assets and the government issues new bonds at the price 1=R t . Household i issues (or invests in) state contingent debt and can buy bonds from the government, while transactions in the asset market are constrained by
where ' t;t+1 denotes a stochastic discount factor (which will be de…ned in Section 2.3). The central bank reinvests its payo¤s from maturing bonds into new government bonds and leaves money supply unchanged at this stage, To account for credit default risk in a simple way, we assume that the realizations of the idiosyncratic productivity levels can freely be observed by borrowers, while lenders can only observe the realized idiosyncratic productivity level at proportional monitoring costs % 0. We then consider the following standard debt contract: Firm j o¤ers a loan at the price 1=R L j;t that leads to a pay-o¤ of 1 when its productivity level is su¢ ciently high ! j;t ! j;t , where ! j;t is the minimum productivity level that enables full repayment. Otherwise, if ! j;t < ! j;t , …rm j goes bankrupt and the lender can seize total revenues. For simplicity, we consider the following maximization problem of …rm j max E t [P z;j;t ! j;t n j;t P t w t n j;t L j;t (R
where it disregards that loan repayments are contingent on idiosyncratic states. 11 The expectations operator E t is based upon the information at the beginning of the period after aggregate state variables, but not productivity levels ! j;t , are realized. After wages are paid, these idiosyncratic productivity levels are drawn from the same potentially time-varying distribution with density function f t (! j;t ) and a mean of one, E t (! j;t ) = 1. Since …rms are ex-ante identical, loan contracts for di¤erent …rms are signed at the same rate R L j;t = R L t and the same size L j;t = L t . The …rst order conditions to the problem (5) are therefore given by R L t 1 = j;t ; (P z;j;t =P t ) n 1 j;t = w t + j;t w t ; (1), and j;t [(L j;t =R L t ) P t w t n j;t ] = 0, where j;t 0 is the multiplier on (1). Hence, intermediate goods producing …rms do not borrow more than required to pay wages w t n j;t if R L t > 1 ) j;t > 0, which will be satis…ed throughout the analysis. Given that j;t = t , n j;t = n t , and P z;j;t = P z;t , all …rms behave in an identical way and the following conditions describe labor demand and loans:
where l t = L t =P t . After idiosyncratic productivity shocks are realized, …rm j fully repays loans l t = (P z;t =P t ) n t if ! j;t or lenders receive (1 %)! j;t (P z;t =P t ) n t if ! j;t < , where %! j;t (P z;t =P t ) n t denotes monitoring costs. Hence, the expected pay-o¤ for a lender is given
, and the expected rate of repayment 1 e t 2 [0; 1) on loans equals
and is therefore exogenous. Firms drawing a productivity level that exceeds transfer their pro…ts to households. Following Christiano et al. (2013), we assume that the distribution of the idiosyncratic productivity shocks can vary stochastically over time in a mean preserving way.
Hence, these shocks to the distribution, which will be called default risk shocks, shift the mass of defaulting …rms over time (i.e. change the standard deviation !;t of idiosyncratic productivity) without a¤ecting the expected productivity. Realizations of default risk shocks, which will be considered in Section 4.1, are revealed at the beginning of the period t, and therefore shift the current period expected rate of repayment 1 e t . Monopolistically competitive retailers buy intermediate goods z t = R 1 0 z j;t dj at the common price P z;t . A retailer k 2 [0; 1] relabels the intermediate good to y k;t and sells it at the price P k;t to perfectly competitive bundlers, who bundle the goods y k;t to the …nal consumption good y t with the technology, y
k;t dk, where " > 1. The cost minimizing demand for y k;t is therefore given by y k;t = (P k;t =P t ) " y t . We assume that each period a measure 1 of randomly selected retailers may reset their prices independently of the time elapsed since the last price setting, while a fraction 2 [0; 1) of retailers do not adjust their prices. A fraction 1 sets their price to maximize the present value of pro…ts. For > 0, the …rst order condition for their price e P t is
where mc t = P z;t =P t denotes retailers'real marginal costs. With perfectly competitive bundlers, the price index P t for the …nal good satis…es P
t s holds, and taking di¤erences, leads to P
Households
There is a continuum of in…nitely lived households indexed with i 2 [0; 1]. Households have identical preferences and asset endowments. Household i maximizes the expected sum of a discounted stream of instantaneous utilities
where > 0; 1; n 0 and E 0 is the expectation operator conditional on the time 0 information set, and 2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor. The term t is a stochastic preference parameter with an autocorrelation coe¢ cient 2 (0; 1), which is typically used in the literature to drive the policy rate down to the ZLB (see e.g. Eggertsson, 2012) . We examine this shock in Section 4.2.
A household i is initially endowed with money M H i; 1 , government bonds B i; 1 , and state contingent claims D i; 1 . In each period, it supplies labor, lends funds to all intermediate goods at this moment and that random draws of eligible loan contracts are made after loan contracts are signed, the price of loans is 1=R L t for all …rms j. We restrict our attention to the case where the central bank supplies a su¢ ciently large share of money via repos, which implies that money will never be withdrawn from the private sector I i;t 0. Hence, households rely on positive holdings of bonds and loans to satisfy the collateral constraint (2). In the goods market, household i can use money holdings net of lending for its consumption expenditures (see 3). Before the asset market opens, household i buys back assets under repos. In the asset market, it receives payo¤s from maturing assets (including loans), buys bonds from the government, borrows (and lends) using a full set of nominally state contingent claims, and trades all assets with other households. Dividing the period t price of one unit of nominal wealth in a particular state of period t + 1 by the period t probability of that state gives the stochastic discount factor ' t;t+1 . The period t price of a payo¤ D i;t in period t + 1 is then
given by E t [' t;t+1 D i;t ]. Substituting out the stock of bonds and money held before the asset market opens, e B i;t and f M i;t , in (4), the asset market constraint of household i can be rewritten as
1) I i;t + P t w t n i;t P t c i;t + P t v i;t + P t i;t ;
where household i 0 s borrowing is restricted by M H i;t 0, B i;t 0, and the no-Ponzi game condition (11) measures the cost of money acquired in open market operations, i.e. household i receives new cash I i;t in exchange for R m t I i;t assets. Maximizing the objective (10) subject to the collateral constraint (2), the goods market constraint (3), the asset market constraint (11) and the borrowing constraints, for given initial values M i; 1 , B i ; 1 , and D i; 1 leads to the following …rst order conditions for consumption, working time, additional money, and loans
t n n i;t = w t i;t + i;t ;
as well as for investment in government bonds, money, and contingent claims
where i;t 0 denotes the multiplier on (11), i;t 0 the multiplier on B t B i;t 1 + t L i;t R m t I i;t , and i;t 0 the multiplier on (3). Further, (2), (3),
and (11) with equality hold as well as the transversality conditions. The risk free R rf t , i.e. the rate of return on a portfolio of contingent claims that guarantees a payo¤ of one unit for all states, is de…ned as R rf t = 1=E t ' t;t+1 . Comparing the …rst order conditions with regard to investment in bonds (16) and contingent claims (18) shows that the risk free rate can di¤er from the bond rate R t by a liquidity premium, which relies on a binding collateral constraint, i;t+1 > 0, and increases with the future fraction of eligible bonds B t+1 . Combining (14) and (15) to R m t i;t + i;t = R L t (1 e t ) i;t + i;t t , shows that the loan rate compensates for default risk and tends to decrease with the expected repayment rate 1 e t as well as with the fraction of eligible loans t , if i;t > 0. Notably, when loans are not fully eligible t < 0, there will be a spread between the policy rate and the loan rate due to a liquidity premium, even if there is no default risk, e t = 0. Combining (14), (16), and (17), leads to
The no-arbitrage condition (21) shows that households are indi¤erent between investing in money or investing in government bonds and converting these (partially) into cash in the next period at the rate R m t+1 . For B t+1 = 1, the interest rate on government bonds is closely linked to next period's expected policy rate, i.e. R t equals E t R m t+1 up to …rst order. When not all bonds are eligible, B t < 1, bonds are less liquid and become more akin to debt issued by households.
Public sector
The central bank transfers seigniorage revenues P t m t to the government, which issues one-period bonds. Government bonds grow at a constant rate, B T t = B T t 1 , where 1 and B T t summarizes the total supply of government bonds, which are typically considered to be eligible for open market operations in normal times. To abstract from …scal policy e¤ects via tax distortions, we assume that the government has access to lump-sum transfers P t t . Its budget constraint reads (B T t =R t ) + P t m t = B T t 1 + P t t , where bonds B T t are either held by households, B t , or the central bank,
, and under repos against bonds,
Given that corporate loans are not held by the central bank until maturity, default on loans do not lead to central bank losses. Alternatively, if it holds risky corporate loans until maturity, the central bank could impose haircuts equal to the default probability in order to avoid losses. The central bank transfers its interest earnings to the government, P t the policy rate R m t 1. It can further adjust the fractions of randomly selected eligible loans t 2 [0; 1] and eligible bonds B t 2 (0; 1], which both a¤ect the size and the composition of the central bank balance sheet. We consider two particular balance sheet policies for the subsequent analysis, i.e. quantitative easing and collateral policy, which are de…ned as follows. 12 Quantitative easing increases money supply against eligible assets in open market operations.
Quantitative easing can be conducted in terms of government bonds or corporate loans and is implemented by an increase in t or B t , respectively.
Collateral policy changes the composition of the central bank's balance sheet without a¤ecting its size. It is implemented by a change in t , accompanied by a neutralizing change in B t .
The central bank further sets the in ‡ation target and controls how money is supplied in exchange for bonds in repos or outright (while loans are only traded under repos). Speci…cally, it sets a constant share of bond repos 0, de…ned as M R t = M H t . In the Sections 3.2 and 4.2, we consider the limiting case ! 1 in order to facilitate the derivation of analytical results.
Equilibrium properties
In this Section, we present some main properties of the rational expectations (RE) equilibrium (see De…nition 3 in Appendix A.1). In the …rst part of this Section, we explain when balance sheet policies are e¤ective. In the second part, we demonstrate that they are in general not equivalent to changes in the policy rate.
When are balance sheet policies e¤ective?
The goods market constraint, which reads P t c t M HDe…nition 3 in Appendix A.1). Hence, if t = 0, such that (22) is slack, balance sheet policies will not a¤ect the equilibrium allocation and the associated price system. To see when this is the case, we …rst use the conditions (12) and (17), which in equilibrium imply t c t = E t t+1 c t+1 t+1 + t and that the multiplier on the goods market constraint t satis…es summarized in the following way (see Appendix A.1).
De…nition 1 For = 1, n = 0, = 1, ! j;t = 1, = 0, ! 1, a RE equilibrium with a binding collateral constraint is a set of sequences fy t , t , R L t , b t g 1 t=0 and P 0 > 0 satisfying
where =
t for a given sequence f t g 1 t=0 and an initial stock of bonds B 1 > 0.
Condition (25), which is based on labor market equilibrium (i.e. n n t = c t and 6), aggregate production, and goods market clearing, shows that the loan rate R L t reduces aggregate output. Condition (26), which is based on (12), (14), (15), and (17) (1) and (3) with the collateral constraint (22) leads to (27), which shows that aggregate demand tends to increase when money supply is increased by raising the fractions of eligible bonds and loans or by lowering the policy rate. The evolution of privately held bonds is further governed by the total supply of bonds (see 28). 16 The policy instruments R mrepresentations, for in ‡ation and output (see 27):
The term t in (29) can be separately a¤ected by t and the instruments R m t and t . When loans are not eligible, t = 0, the terms t = B t =R m t and t = ( = ) E t [ t+1 = t 1 t+1 ] imply that changes in the policy rate and inverse changes in the fraction of eligible bonds B t a¤ect output and in ‡ation in an identical way. Hence, both instrument can be used equivalently unless one of them cannot be adjusted due to feasibility constraints, like the ZLB (see Section 4.2). If, however, loans are eligible t > 0, the conditions in (29) reveal that policy instruments are not equivalent.
In particular, changes in the policy rate R m t as well as in the fraction of eligible loans t can alter the term t , and therefore output and in ‡ation, di¤erently from t via their direct e¤ects on the loan rate (see Section 4.1).
Limits to conventional monetary policy
In the previous Section, we have demonstrated that monetary policy instruments are in general not equivalent. In this Section, we consider two particular scenarios, where this property is exploited to use quantitative easing and collateral policy in order to implement equilibria that are preferable to equilibria which are implementable when only conventional interest rate policy is available.
For the …rst scenario, we consider default risk shocks, i.e. shocks to the variance of idiosyncratic productivity, and show that the central bank can fully neutralize these shocks with collateral policy, which is not possible under a pure interest rate policy. For the second scenario, we consider a contractionary preference shock and show that quantitative easing can serve as a substitute for reductions in the policy rate, when the latter is at the ZLB. Throughout the analysis, we consider the more realistic case of imperfectly ‡exible prices, > 0.
Collateral policy and default risk shocks
For the …rst scenario, we examine default risk shocks, i.e., mean preserving changes in the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity of borrowers (as in Christiano et al., 2013) , while we disregard preference shocks, t = 1, for convenience. Speci…cally, we consider an increase in the standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity !;t that increases the probability of default, F t ( ), and reduces the expected repayment rate of loans (see 8), which induces lenders to demand a higher loan rate. Since changes in the loan rate a¤ect marginal costs of …rms (see 6), the default risk shock has a cost push e¤ect on the production sector, which tends to increase the price level, giving rise to welfare losses due to imperfect price adjustments. Thus, default risk shocks exert purely distortionary e¤ects. Put di¤erently, shocks to the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity would not a¤ect aggregate variables in a frictionless economy when …rms have access to a complete asset market, while they cause in ‡ation and output responses in this model, which are entirely welfare reducing. Hence, a central bank that aims at maximizing welfare should neutralize these shocks.
When the standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity shocks is positive and a non-zero fraction of intermediate goods producing …rms default, F t ( ) > 0, lenders take the default probability into account (see 15). Combining (12), (14), (15), and (17), the loan rate then satis…es
instead of (26). Under a time varying distribution of idiosyncratic productivity, the expected repayment rate 1 e t also varies over time (see 8). According to the assumption that changes in the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity shocks are revealed at the beginning of the period, shocks to the expected default rate e t a¤ect the loan rate in the same period. In particular, the loan rate then tends to increase with the expected default rate (see 30). 17 The right hand side of (30) shows that the central bank can in principle o¤set default risk shocks, i.e. changes in If, however, the central bank simultaneously reduces the fraction of eligible bonds B t , it can compensate for the change in t or in R m t in a way such that money supply and thus aggregate demand are held constant. Given that the policy instruments R m t , t , and B t a¤ect the private sector behavior only via the collateral constraint (22) and the pricing conditions for bonds (21) and loans (30), the central bank can completely neutralize the e¤ects of the default risk shocks 1 7 Even when all loans are eligible, t = 1, the default rate tends to increase the loan rate, 1=R ) (see 30), given that the central bank is not exposed to the risk of default. on the equilibrium allocation, since the latter is not a¤ected by changes in the bond price (see De…nition 4 in Appendix A.1). This result for a collateral policy is summarized in the following proposition. 18 Proposition 2 Under a binding collateral constraint, the central bank can fully neutralize default risk shocks by collateral policy, but not by policy rate adjustments alone.
Proof. See Appendix A.2
It should be noted that the success of collateral policy in this scenario is limited to small default risk shocks. Speci…cally, the maximum size of default risk changes that can completely be neutralized by collateral policy is determined by the size of the liquidity premium (see proof of Proposition 2). 19 The central bank can nevertheless mitigate the e¤ects of larger default risk shocks through collateral policy, i.e. by reducing the illiquidity premium on loans. 20
Quantitative easing at the zero lower bound
The second scenario refers to policy options at the ZLB. For this, we consider a shock to the preference parameter t following other studies on public policy at the ZLB, like Eggertsson (2012), while we disregard idiosyncratic productivity shocks, ! j;t = 1, for convenience. We further disregard central bank lending against corporate debt, t = 0, such that only government bonds are eligible. Changes in the policy rate and in the fraction of eligible bonds then exert equivalent e¤ects on the equilibrium allocation (see 29). However, quantitative easing will be particularly useful for the central bank when the policy rate cannot be adjusted in the desired way, i.e. when reductions in the policy rate are not feasible due to the ZLB. Notably, a conventional macroeconomic model would predict quantitative easing to be entirely ine¤ective in this case, given that changes in money supply are neutral when all interest rates are at the ZLB.
To facilitate the derivation of analytical results, we apply a local analysis at a steady state with a binding collateral constraint. In the steady state, which is described in Appendix A.2, all real variables are constant and are denoted by small letters without a time index. The steady state Euler equation rate satis…es R Euler = = as usual, while the loan rate equals the Euler equation rate, R L = R Euler , since t = 0 (see 26). The central bank sets the policy rate below the Euler equation rate in the steady state. Hence, there is a liquidity premium, as revealed by the steady state version of (24), = c [(1=R m ) ( = )] 0. We assume that government bonds are initially not fully eligible, leaving room for maneuver for quantitative easing, 21 and that the in ‡ation target is consistent with long-run price stability, = 1. 22 Given that = 1 implies R Euler > 1 and that R m < R Euler , the goods market constraint and the collateral constraint are binding in the steady state (see Proposition 1). In a neighborhood of this steady state, the equilibrium sequences are approximated by the solutions to the linearized equilibrium conditions (see Appendix A.2). A RE equilibrium is then de…ned as follows, where b a t denotes relative deviations of a generic variable a t from its steady state value a : b a t = log(a t =a).
De…nition 2 For ! 1, = = ! j;t = 1, R m 2 [1; 1= ), B < 1, and t = 0, a RE equilibrium is a set of convergent sequences fb
where = (1 )(1 )= and $ = 1+ n + > 1, for monetary policy setting fb and preference shocks satisfying
The linear model summarized in De…nition 2 is similar to a New Keynesian model with the "cost channel" (see Ravenna and Walsh, 2007) . In particular, the conditions (32) and (33) resemble standard conditions for aggregate demand and for aggregate supply, where the latter is a¤ected by the cost of loans due to the working capital assumption. The crucial di¤erence to the canonical New Keynesian model is, however, that this is not a single interest rate framework. Speci…cally, the policy rate, which is not identical to the loan rate (since t 6 = 1, see 26), neither enters (32) nor (33). Nevertheless, the policy rate a¤ects the equilibrium allocation via the (consolidated version of the) money supply constraint (31). Thus, an increase in the policy rate tends -for a given amount of eligible bonds -to reduce the amount of money and thereby aggregate demand.
For the central bank's objective, we apply Ravenna and Walsh's (2007) approximated household welfare function of an isomorphic model. 23 The e¢ cient output level, which would be realized under ‡exible prices (see 25 for the = 1 case) and a policy rate pegged at one, is constant 2 1 Alternatively, we can set B t equal to one and allow for long-term treasury securities to be accepted as collateral. 2 2 Precisely, the central bank implements long-run price stability by long-run adjustments of B t contingent on the supply of government bonds. We can therefore disregard the case of a growing supply of bonds, which can be neutralized by a shrinking fraction of eligible bonds, and we assume -without loss of generality -that = 1.y = ( = ) =( n+ 1+ ) and leads to output gaps y g t satisfying y g t = y t =y and, thus, b y g t = b y t . We assume that the central bank cannot fully commit to future policies. Taking expectations and …scal policy as given, it minimizes a loss function L t in a discretionary way,
L, > 0, and = ( =") ($ 1) (see Ravenna and Walsh, 2007) , subject to the private sector equilibrium conditions (32) and (33). By eliminating the lending rate, (32) and (33) can be combined to a single constraint to the policy problem,
The central bank then faces a trade-o¤ between stabilizing the price level and output even if only preference shocks are present. 24 Minimizing L t with respect to b t and b y t in a discretionary way, leads to
The optimal discretionary plan of the central bank then is a set of sequences f b R L t ; b t ; b y t g 1 t=0 satisfying (32), (33), and (35). When preference shocks b t are small, such that R m t > 1, the central bank can implement this optimal plan solely by adjusting the policy rate according to (31) and (34) for a given fraction of eligible assets B . In particular, a decline in t , which leads to a fall in in ‡ation under the optimal plan, calls for a reduction in the policy rate R m t (see 31). Hence, if the economy is hit by a su¢ ciently large contractionary t -shock, the ZLB can render the implementation of the optimal plan by policy rate adjustments impossible. In this case, the central bank can still implement the plan via quantitative easing, i.e. by increasing B t . This is shown for the parameter restrictions < (1 + n ) = and " > 2, which ensure equilibrium uniqueness and unambiguous responses under the optimal plan. 25 Proposition 3 Consider a RE equilibrium as given in De…nition 2 for < (1 + n ) = and " > 2. A central bank acting without commitment can implement its policy plan, even if the policy rate is at the ZLB, by conducting quantitative easing.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Proposition 3 implies that quantitative easing can increase the set of states, for which the central bank can implement its optimal plan. Quantitative easing, however, also reaches its limits either when B t approaches one or when the collateral constraint becomes slack. Easing money supply tends to increase current aggregate demand, which implies a decreasing Euler equation rate. When the latter falls to a level that equals the policy rate, collateral is abundant and quantitative easing becomes neutral. A condition for a positive multiplier on the collateral constraint at the ZLB is given in the proof of Proposition 3. 26 Notably, quantitative easing in terms of treasuries, i.e.
an exogenous and autocorrelated increase of B t , further leads to a decline in the bond rate as well as in the loan rate, since it reduces the marginal valuation of liquid assets. 27 This pattern is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) for the Fed's asset purchases between 2008 and 2011.
Limits to balance sheet policies
It has been shown in the previous Section that quantitative easing and collateral policy can be useful additional instruments for the central bank. Here, we explore how the e¤ectiveness of balance sheet policies is limited. We apply a numerical analysis, where we disregard preference and productivity shocks ( t = ! j;t = 1), which have been examined before. To allow for a reasonable quanti…cation of the e¤ects and to facilitate the calibration of the model, we introduce investment in physical capital, which is described in the …rst part of this Section. In the second part, we analyze e¤ects of isolated balance sheet policies, for which we consider a policy experiment where quantitative easing is exogenously conducted. In the third part, we examine responses of balance sheet policies to a shock to the liquidity demand for investment. This shock has been described as a major factor in the crisis of 2008 (as argued by Del Negro et al., 2013) and leads, in particular, to a large liquidity premium between eligible and non-eligible assets, as observed during the crisis.
Extension and calibration
For a quantitative analysis, we extend the model presented in Section 2 by introducing capital accumulation, while disregarding idiosyncratic productivity shocks and preference shocks, for convenience. Households own the stock of capital, k t = R k i;t di, and rent it to …rms at the rate r k t . The capital stock of household i evolves according to k i;t = (1 k ) k i;t 1 + x i;t S (x i;t =x i;t 1 ), where k 2 (0; 1) denotes the depreciation rate and x t investment expenditures. Following large parts of the literature on quantitative macroeconomic models (see e.g. Christiano et al., 2005) , we introduce investment adjustment costs to avoid extreme investment responses to aggregate shocks,
2 , where # > 0. We assume that households rely on cash for 2 6 Speci…cally, this condition (see 68) is satis…ed if the steady state spread between the Euler equation rate and the policy rate, ( = ) R m , is su¢ ciently large. For the parameter values applied in De…nition 1 and = 1, it
, where the threshold for the policy rate is strictly larger than one, > 1, if the substitution elasticity " lies between 2 and 1572.
2 7 This is shown in Appendix B, which is made available online.
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purchases of investment goods up to a time-varying fraction x;t 0. We further introduce a parameter c > 0, which determines the fraction of purchases of consumption goods that require cash. Thus, the cash constraint (3) is replaced by c P t c i;t + x;t P t x i;t
such that money demand of households is increasing in c and x;t . These parameters allow relating expenditures to the monetary base in accordance with empirical counterparts. Intermediate goods producing …rms rent capital from households. Firm j produces with technology z j;t = n j;t k 1 j;t 1 and pays the rents after their goods are sold, facing (1). Its …rst order conditions for R L t > 1 are given by mc j;t (n j;t =k j;t 1 ) 1 = w t R L t , mc j;t (1 ) (n j;t =k j;t 1 ) = r k t , and (7). We further introduce (exogenous) government spending, such that market clearing requires y t = c t + x t + g t . 28 For the numerical analysis, we use standard parameter values as much as possible. The parameters of the utility function equal = 2 and n = 1, the labor share equals = 0:66, the steady state markup 1=mc = 11% (" = 10), steady state working time n = 1=3, the fraction of non-optimally price adjusting …rms = 0:75, the share of government spending g=y = 0:19, and the adjustment cost parameter # = 2:5 (see e.g. Christiano et al., 2005) . The steady state values of x;t and c are calibrated to the observed ratios P x=M 0 = 1:15 and P c=M 0 = 2:71, and the depreciation rate is set to k = 0:023 to match the observed ratio of consumption to investment, c=x = 2:36. 29 The long-run policy rate is set at R m = 1:0133 (or 5.41% in terms of annualized rates), which equals the average of the federal funds rate, and the in ‡ation target is set at its average value = 1:00647 (or 2.61% at an annual rate). 30 The policy rate is either held at its long-run mean R m (in Section 5.2) or set according to a simple Taylor rule b R m t = b t + y b y t with = 1:5 and y = 0:5 1=4 (in Section 5.3). We consider the case where loans are not eligible in the steady state, i.e. = 0, which accords to the Fed's precrisis "Treasuries only" regime. In contrast, bonds are fully eligible, B = 1, where we assumewithout explicitly specifying -that the supply of bonds is consistent with the steady state in ‡ation rate. We further set the repo share to = 1:5 to match the observed ratio between total reserves and reserves supplied under repurchase agreements, which was almost constant in the 2000s. 31 The spread between the policy rate and the loan rate, which equals the Euler equation rate R L = R Euler = = in a steady state with = 0, is crucial for the size of monetary policy e¤ects. According to the literature on the "corporate bond yield spread" (see Christensen, 2008) , the yield spread between treasury securities and corporate bonds can be attributed to a default risk component and a liquidity component (see e.g. Longsta¤ et al., 2005) . Since we disregard default risk shocks in this Section, we focus on the liquidity component. Speci…cally, we refer to Longsta¤ et al.'s (2005) estimate of the liquidity premium for the spread between corporate bonds and treasury securities, who report that, for AAA rated corporate bonds, 51% of the credit spread can be explained by default risk. Given that the average short-term spread for AAA corporate bonds equals 104 basis points at annualized rates (see Longsta¤ et al., 2005) , we apply a liquidity premium of (1 + 49% 0:0104) 
Maximum e¤ects of quantitative easing
The calibrated model is solved by applying a …rst-order approximation at the deterministic steady state. To examine the e¤ects of an isolated balance sheet policy, we consider a policy experiment with exogenous quantitative easing. Speci…cally, we compute impulse responses to an unexpected shift in the fraction of eligible loans t , which is assumed to follow an AR(1) process with mean and an autocorrelation > 0. 32 Notably, a corresponding experiment with quantitative easing in terms of treasuries (i.e. shocks to B t ) leads to virtually identical e¤ects. Variables are either given in terms of percentage deviations from steady state, e.g. e y t = 100 b y t , or in absolute terms.
The policy rate is held at its mean, R m t = R m . Balance sheet policies are then e¤ective as long as the collateral constraint is binding, i.e. the Euler equation rate exceeds the mean policy rate.
Easing money supply will however increase consumption until R Euler t ! R m , such that households' and …rms'cash demand will be satiated and collateral becomes abundant. To see this, recall that the multiplier on the collateral constraint t (see 24) has to satisfy 
Quantitative easing under liquidity demand shocks
We now consider a second scenario where the economy is hit by an increase in the fraction x;t of investment goods that have to be purchased with cash (see 36). This shock, which implies that less investment can be …nanced on credit, can be interpreted as an increase in …nancial distress (1) process for x;t with mean x > 0 and an autocorrelation of 0:75. The policy rate is endogenously adjusted according to the Taylor rule. We consider a shock that drives the policy rate to the ZLB in the impact period, which requires e x;t = 12:78%. The solid line in Figure 2 shows the impulse responses to this shock without quantitative easing. Investment and consumption fall, so that output declines by 1:29% despite the endogenous reduction of the policy rate. In ‡ation falls, while the spread between the policy rate and the loan rate increases in a substantial way, which increases the scope for quantitative easing.
The starred line shows the responses for the case where the central bank applies a maximum quantitative easing policy in terms of corporate debt at the ZLB, which is again identi…ed by a multiplier on the collateral constraint approaching zero on impact, 1 ! 0. Though, the central bank can accommodate the increase in money demand by raising t , it cannot completely neutralize the liquidity demand shocks, even when the collateral constraint is binding. The reason is that an increase in x;t does not only a¤ect money demand via (36), but also tends to raise the required return on investment in physical capital, given that investment -as "cash goods" -become more costly. 33 Quantitative easing is only conducted in the …rst period, as the policy rate increases afterwards. This policy substantially mitigates the contractionary output e¤ect of the shock, as output falls on impact by only 0:65% (while it is virtually una¤ected afterwards). In ‡ation falls by slightly less (5 basis points) than in the case without intervention. Since the impact output contraction is reduced by 50%, the analysis shows that quantitative easing can exert output e¤ects in response to liquidity demand shocks that are much larger than in the case where it is exogenously conducted (see Section 5.2). The reason is that the liquidity premium, which determines the scope of balance sheet policies, is here much larger than in the latter case.
Conclusion
Balance sheet policies have recently been introduced by several central banks, while policy rates were set at the ZLB. At the same time, conventional macroeconomic analysis of monetary policy predicts that balance sheet policies at the ZLB are irrelevant as long as they do not a¤ect expectations about future polices. In this paper, we augment a standard monetary model to be applicable for the analysis of the e¤ects as well as the limitations of balance sheet policies. We show that they can be non-neutral, even when the central bank cannot commit to future policies and …nancial intermediation is not disrupted. As a main principle, we …nd that this relies on the scarcity of eligible assets, which is re ‡ected by a liquidity premium. We further show that quantitative easing (i.e. increasing the balance sheet's size) and collateral policy (i.e. changing the balance sheet's composition) are not equivalent to policy rate adjustments and are particularly useful when pure interest rate policy reaches its limits: Collateral policy can neutralize shifts in …rms' borrowing costs, while quantitative easing allows to implement a stabilizing policy even when the policy rate is at the ZLB. A numerical analysis shows that quantitative easing is particularly helpful in response to a surge in liquidity demand as in the crisis of 2008.
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A Appendix
A.1 Rational expectations equilibrium
In equilibrium, markets clear,
, and B T t = B t + B C t , and (9) can be written as Z t = " " 1 Z 1;t =Z 2;t , where Z t = e P t =P t , Z 1;t = c t y t mc t + E t " t+1 Z 1;t+1 and Z 2;t = c t y t + E t " 1 t+1 Z 2;t+1 . The price index
. Aggregate output satis…es x t = n t , where n t = R 1 0 n j;t dj, since E t (! j;t ) = 1, and
De…nition 3 A RE equilibrium is given by a set of sequences fc t , y t ,
(1
1=R
Euler t demand (see 47). De…ne a t as the equilibrium value of a generic variable a t that prevails for ! j;t = 0
. Let e t be a particular value for the fraction of eligible loans given by
where 
for which we eliminated t with e t (see 58) in (56 
Since s is bounded from below and neither productivity nor labor supply exhibit trend growth, real resources cannot permanently grow with a non-zero rate, y = c = n =s. Then, Z 2;t converges to Z 2 = yc = 1
as well as e Z are constant and Z 1;t = Z 1 = yc mc 1 " holds, real marginal costs are also constant and given by mc = e Z (" 1) " 1 (1 
Given that the loan rate, marginal costs, and working time are constant in a steady state, (47) implies a constant steady state wage rate, w = mc n 1 =R L . Moreover, the steady state is characterized by n n = wc , c = n , and
c (see 38, 53, 54, and 48) . We now consider the simpli…ed case, where ! 1 and = = 1. Log-linearizing (38), (47), (49), (50), (53), (54), and b t = b t 1 1 t at the steady state gives
where = (1 )(1 )= . Further, log-linearizing (39) for e t = 0, using (59), and de…ning
where we used that the preference shock is autocorrelated:
Combining (44) and (45) with (48)
where we eliminated wages (with 60), and & = " 1 " =R m > 1 and $ = 1+ n + > 1 + hold. Eliminating b w t , b n t , and c mc t in (60)-(63), we can summarize the RE equilibrium as a set of
that converge to the steady state and satisfy (61), (62), (63), and
for fb t , b , and real bonds with (28), leads to the following four equilibrium conditions for R L t , y t , t and t : (69), > 0, which can be solved sequentially. Now, consider a steady state, where all variables grow with a constant rate (so that time indices are considered), and suppose that the central bank holds R m t and t constant in the long-run. Then, (69) and (70) imply that steady state in ‡ation depends only on the growth rate of B t and on : = g ;t , where B t = g ;t B t 1 . The central bank can therefore control the steady state in ‡ation rate by setting g ;t contingent on , while the steady state price level is stable, = 1, i¤ g = 1 .
Proposition 5 (QE-e¤ects on interest rates) Consider a RE equilibrium as given in De…n-ition 2 for < (1 + n ) = . When the policy rate is at the ZLB, the equilibrium is uniquely determined and an exogenous increase in B t leads to a decline in the bond rate as well as in the loan rate.
Proof of proposition 5.
To establish the claims made in the proposition, we consider the e¤ects of an exogenous and autocorrelated increase in B t (where is the coe¢ cient of autocor-relation) when the policy rate is held at the ZLB, R m t = 1. We start by examining the bond rate. Using (14) and (18) is initially satis…ed in a steady state (where R rf t = R Euler = = ) with a binding collateral constraint, the bond rate R t is, up to …rst order, decreasing in the expected fraction of eligible bonds E t B t+1 for R m t = 1. To examine the loan rate, we now consider the model given in de…nition 2 for b t = 0, which can be further reduced to (34) 1 + 1+ , which is ensured by < (1 + n ) = . Then, there exists exactly one stable eigenvalue, between zero and one, and one unstable eigenvalue, indicating local determinacy.
Given that the stable eigenvalue is strictly positive, we know that the unique solution to the system (31)- (34), is given by the generic form b t = 1 b b t 1 + 2 b 
